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ABSTRACT 
  North Carolina is the only state never to have enacted a 
certification procedure, which would allow federal courts, in 
appropriate cases, to send questions of North Carolina law to the 
North Carolina Supreme Court. Previous calls for certification’s 
adoption in this state have been unsuccessful, perhaps because the 
North Carolina Supreme Court’s jurisdictional precedent seems to 
undercut certification’s constitutionality. Reexamined in light of the 
North Carolina Constitution’s design and the structure of the General 
Court of Justice, however, this precedent does not render certification 
unconstitutional. Even if the North Carolina Supreme Court holds to 
the contrary, certification could be adopted by constitutional 
amendment or under a theory that answering certified questions does 
not require an exercise of jurisdiction. North Carolina therefore can 
and should adopt certification. Such a procedure will avoid federal 
court guesswork on difficult state law issues, ensuring fairness for the 
litigants while saving time and money for future parties and the North 
Carolina courts. Certification’s potential pitfalls can be circumvented 
through careful drafting and the North Carolina Supreme Court’s 
conscientious use of discretion. Bearing principles of judicial 
economy, comity, and federalism in mind, North Carolina should at 
last join the rest of the union in adopting certification. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 1966, the Fifth Circuit confronted a knotty question of state 
law.1 A Florida citizen, returning on a round-trip ticket purchased in 
Florida, died when the plane crashed in Illinois.2 The court wrestled 
with whether the Illinois wrongful death statute, which capped 
damages, violated Florida public policy.3 What meager precedent 
there was consisted of only automobile cases and conflicting authority 
from other jurisdictions, and the academy was clamoring for 
departure from traditional choice-of-law considerations.4 Ultimately, 
the decision rested not on “ascertain[ing] what had been held,” but on 
“divining the policy considerations which the Supreme Court of 
Florida would now embrace.”5 
Stymied by such a “delicate choice,” the Fifth Circuit took 
advantage of a Florida procedure allowing it to certify the question 
before it to the Florida Supreme Court, which overruled itself to hold 
the cap applicable.6 Receiving the state court’s reply, the Fifth Circuit 
reflected on the certification procedure’s value: 
  For a Federal Court to have attempted to resolve the question on 
its own would have been fraught with great hazard both to litigants 
and the law. That is especially so since the Supreme Court out of a 
single mass of materials reached at different times divergent results. 
  . . . [W]here Erie often compels the most speculative anticipation 
on matters not yet decided, Florida’s procedure gives a clear, 
positive, final decisive answer. It is not just a bright clear light 
showing the Erie-way . . . . it is what the law actually is on the precise 
point presented to us and certified for answer. It is Florida law 
binding on us as we perform our Erie role.7 
 
 1. See Hopkins v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp. (Hopkins I), 358 F.2d 347 (5th Cir. 1966). 
 2. Id. at 348. 
 3. Id. at 348–49. 
 4. Id. at 349. 
 5. Hopkins v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp. (Hopkins II), 394 F.2d 656, 656–57 (5th Cir. 1968). 
 6. Id. The Florida Supreme Court first held, over dissent, that the Illinois damages cap did 
not apply, Hopkins v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp. (Hopkins III), 201 So. 2d 743, 748 (Fla. 1967), 
then reversed itself 4–3 on rehearing, holding the cap applicable, id. at 752. 
 7. Hopkins II, 394 F.2d at 657 (footnotes omitted). 
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A certification8 procedure like the one just described authorizes a 
federal court,9 under certain circumstances, to certify (that is, send) 
questions of state law with which it is faced to the state’s highest 
court.10 The state high court, if it so chooses,11 resolves the certified 
question with the expectation that the parties will return to federal 
court for further proceedings.12 
North Carolina remains the only state never to have enacted 
such a procedure,13 putting it behind the District of Columbia,14 
Puerto Rico,15 the Northern Mariana Islands,16 and Guam.17 Previous 
calls for certification’s adoption in North Carolina have been 
unsuccessful.18 In a 1999 article, then-practitioner19 Jessica Smith 
 
 8. Like much of the literature, this Note employs “certification” as shorthand for 
“interjurisdictional certification.” See generally 17A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL 
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 4248 (3d ed. 2007) (using the same convention). Intrajurisdictional 
certification procedures, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1254(2) (2000), are beyond this Note’s scope. 
 9. Some certification procedures allow other states’ appellate courts to certify, as well. 
See, e.g., W. VA. CODE ANN. § 51-1A-3 (LexisNexis 2000) (allowing interstate certification). 
The arguments for interstate certification parallel those for federal-state certification. For 
convenience, this Note refers only to “federal courts.” 
 10. See, e.g., ALA. R. APP. P. 18(a) (allowing federal courts to certify questions “which are 
determinative of [the] cause” before that court when “there are no clear controlling 
precedents”). 
 11. See, e.g., ARK. SUP. CT. R. 6-8(a) (“The Supreme Court may, in its discretion, answer 
questions of law certified to it . . . .”). 
 12. See, e.g., id. 6-8(g) (“The written opinion of the Supreme Court stating the law 
governing the questions certified shall be sent . . . to the certifying court . . . .”). 
 13. See Rebecca A. Cochran, Federal Court Certification of Questions of State Law to State 
Courts: A Theoretical and Empirical Study, 29 J. LEGIS. 157, 159 n.13 (2002) (listing the then-
existing state certification procedures and concluding that only Arkansas, New Jersey, and 
North Carolina had none). Arkansas and New Jersey have since adopted certification. See ARK. 
CONST. amend. LXXX, § 2(D)(3); ARK. SUP. CT. R. 6-8; N.J. R. APP. P. 2:12A-1 to A-8. Note, 
however, that Missouri’s certification procedure, MO. ANN. STAT. § 477.004 (West 2004), is 
nonfunctional: the Missouri Supreme Court held that answering a certified question would be 
unconstitutional, Grantham v. Mo. Dep’t of Corr., No. 72576, 1990 WL 602159, at *1 (Mo. July 
13, 1990) (en banc). 
 14. See D.C. CODE § 11-723 (2001); D.C. CT. APP. R. 22 (authorizing certification). 
 15. See P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 4, § 24s(f) (2003); P.R. SUP. CT. R. 23 (authorizing 
certification). 
 16. See N. MAR. I. R. APP. P. 5, available at http://www.cnmilaw.org/pdf/court_rules/ 
R02.pdf (authorizing certification, adopted prior to 2004). 
 17. See GUAM R. APP. P. 20(b), available at http://www.guamsupremecourt.com/Rules/ 
images/GRAP%2002212007.pdf (authorizing certification, adopted in 2007). 
 18. See Jessica Smith, Avoiding Prognostication and Promoting Federalism: The Need for 
an Inter-Jurisdictional Certification Procedure in North Carolina, 77 N.C. L. REV. 2123, 2125 
(1999) (recommending that North Carolina adopt a certification procedure); see also JONA 
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urged state lawmakers to create a certification procedure, concluding 
that the North Carolina Constitution poses no bar.20 Unfortunately, 
her analysis fails to account for the North Carolina Supreme Court’s 
jurisdictional precedent, which prohibits the General Assembly from 
enlarging the supreme court’s jurisdiction even though no such 
prohibition appears in the North Carolina Constitution’s text.21 This 
precedent poses an obstacle to certification’s adoption in North 
Carolina. 
That obstacle can be overcome. This Note takes the position that 
North Carolina can and should adopt a certification procedure. Part I 
lays out the case for certification, discussing how careful drafting and 
the North Carolina Supreme Court’s conscientious use of discretion 
can maximize certification’s benefits while avoiding pitfalls. Part II 
analyzes the difficulties certification may face in North Carolina, 
specifically the possibility that it violates the state constitution. Part 
III offers strategies for implementing certification that circumvent 
these constitutional problems and proposes features the certification 
procedure should incorporate. 
I.  THE CASE FOR CERTIFICATION 
Although North Carolina is the country’s last certification 
holdout, bandwagon arguments alone should not dictate state policy. 
This Part lays out a three-part case for why North Carolina should 
adopt a certification procedure. Section A describes certification’s 
 
GOLDSCHMIDT, CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS OF LAW: FEDERALISM IN PRACTICE 98 (1995) 
(same); J. Donald Hobart, Jr., Note, Currie v. United States and the Elusive “Duty to Commit” 
Dangerous Mental Patients: Conflicting Views of North Carolina Law from the Federal Courts, 
66 N.C. L. REV. 1311, 1334 & n.162 (1988) (suggesting that certification, though difficult to 
implement, would be superior to conflicting federal court interpretations of an unclear state 
law). Although the North Carolina General Statutes Commission has had an open docket on 
the Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act for a number of years, it has never 
recommended a certification statute to the General Assembly. Telephone Interview with P. Bly 
Hall, Assistant Reviser of Statutes, N.C. Gen. Statutes Comm’n, in Durham, N.C. (Mar. 17, 
2008). 
 19. Professor Smith joined the faculty of the North Carolina School of Government shortly 
after publishing. See UNC School of Government – Faculty: Jessica Smith, http://www.sog. 
unc.edu/about/directory/jsmith.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2008) (listing the faculty member’s 
starting date). 
 20. See Smith, supra note 18, at 2141–43 (analyzing the North Carolina Constitution but 
not the North Carolina Supreme Court’s jurisdictional precedent). 
 21. See infra Part II.B. 
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development as a solution to Erie’s problems and abstention’s 
shortcomings. Section B details certification’s benefits to litigants, the 
federal courts, and the North Carolina Courts. Section C explains 
how North Carolina can avoid potential pitfalls through drafting and 
the North Carolina Supreme Court’s conscientious use of discretion. 
A. Erie’s Problems, Abstention, and Certification 
Certification developed in this country in response to difficulties 
arising out of the 1938 case Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.22 Erie 
demands that a federal court decide substantive state law questions 
exactly as a state court would.23 Obeying Erie is straightforward if 
state law is clear,24 but predicting how the state supreme court would 
decide an unclear issue is neither easy25 nor value-free.26 For unsettled 
issues implicating state policy, a federal court’s Erie-based prediction 
creates “needless friction with [the] state.”27 
In response to this friction, the federal courts developed 
doctrines of abstention.28 When it abstains, a federal court avoids 
adjudicating a state law issue by sending the parties to state court to 
obtain a declaratory judgment.29 This process has significant flaws. 
 
 22. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Certification already existed in Britain 
at the time. See J. Michael Medina, The Interjurisdictional Certification of Questions of Law 
Experience: Federal, State, and Oklahoma—Should Arkansas Follow?, 45 ARK. L. REV. 99, 99–
100 (1992) (citing The British Law Ascertainment Act of 1859, 22 & 23 Vict. ch. 63). 
 23. See, e.g., Waste Control Specialists, LLC v. Envirocare of Tex., Inc., 199 F.3d 781, 785 
n.2 (5th Cir. 2000) (“[A] federal court applies state law exactly as would a state court.” (citing 
Erie R.R. Co., 304 U.S. at 64)), modified on other grounds, 207 F.3d 225 (5th Cir. 2000). 
 24. Bradford R. Clark, Ascertaining the Laws of the Several States: Positivism and Judicial 
Federalism After Erie, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1459, 1467 (1997). 
 25. See Smith, supra note 18, at 2133 (“[T]he federal judge [must] consider, among other 
things, the entire body of relevant state law, any pertinent trends bearing on the particular issue 
before him, treatises, restatements, law review articles or other materials that he thinks the state 
court might find persuasive, as well as decisions from other jurisdictions . . . .”). 
 26. See Clark, supra note 24, at 1469–71 (equating the policymaking judgments necessary 
for deciding unclear legal questions with legislation); see also infra notes 50–51 and 
accompanying text. 
 27. R.R. Comm’n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500–01 (1941) (instructing the district court 
to refer the parties to state court for a declaratory judgment on state law in “avoidance of 
needless friction with state policies”). 
 28. See La. Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 28–29 (1959) (requiring 
abstention on a state law issue that was “intimately involved with sovereign prerogative”); 
Pullman, 312 U.S. at 500–01 (requiring abstention as a matter of constitutional avoidance). 
 29. See 17A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 8, § 4241 (describing the abstention doctrines). 
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Foremost among these is “legendary” cost and delay: the parties must 
leave federal court to initiate a full round of state litigation plus any 
attendant appeals, and then return to federal court for another full 
round of litigation and appeals.30 Moreover, the state supreme court 
may not definitively resolve the relevant issue, as that court can 
decline review—undercutting the reason to abstain in the first place.31 
Accordingly, many commentators have rejected abstention as 
unacceptable.32 
Meanwhile, an alternative to abstention has evolved: 
certification. Facing uncertain state law questions in Clay v. Sun 
Insurance Office Ltd.,33 the U.S. Supreme Court seized upon Florida’s 
little-known certification statute, suggesting that the court below 
certify rather than abstain.34 The decision touched off a steady 
movement toward consensus: the Uniform Certification of Questions 
of Law Act appeared in 1967, to be adopted by eighteen states, the 
District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico over the following twenty 
years.35 Where state constitutions barred certification, states amended 
their constitutions.36 Eventually, only Arkansas, New Jersey, and 
 
 30. See Martha A. Field, The Abstention Doctrine Today, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 590, 591 
(1977) (describing certification’s attendant cost and delay as “legendary”). 
 31. Id. at 604–05. 
 32. E.g., David P. Currie, The Federal Courts and the American Law Institute (Part II), 36 
U. CHI. L. REV. 268, 317 (1969) (“[T]he delays and added cost of abstention . . . [are] too high a 
price to pay . . . .”); Field, supra note 30, at 592 (“[T]he abstention procedure is not worth its 
costs . . . .”). 
 33. Clay v. Sun Ins. Office Ltd., 363 U.S. 207 (1960). 
 34. See id. at 212 & n.3 (praising the Florida legislature’s “rare foresight” in creating the 
procedure); see also Judith S. Kaye & Kenneth I. Weissman, Interactive Judicial Federalism: 
Certified Questions in New York, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 373, 381–82 (2000) (describing the 
Florida certification statute and its nonuse at the time). 
The U.S. Supreme Court has continued to promote certification as a procedure that “in 
the long run save[s] time, energy, and resources and helps build a cooperative judicial 
federalism.” Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 391 (1974); see also Arizonans for Official 
English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 79–80 (1997) (recommending certification in a challenge to a 
new state constitutional amendment); Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 150–51 (1976) 
(recommending certification in a challenge to an abortion statute). 
 35. See Unif. Certification of Questions of Law Act note (1967) (Refs. and Annotations) 
(listing jurisdictions that have adopted the act). As of 2007, this act had been adopted by twenty-
four states. See id.; see also Unif. Certification of Questions of Law Act, 12 U.L.A. 67, 67 (1995) 
(revising the 1967 act; adopted in seven states). 
 36. Utah’s procedure, for example, was initially deemed unconstitutional. See Holden v. N 
L Indus., 629 P.2d 428, 432 (Utah 1981) (“[T]his Court has no jurisdiction to provide federal 
courts the requested ruling on state law.”). In response, the state amended its constitution and 
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North Carolina had never adopted a procedure.37 Arkansas amended 
its constitution in 2000 and issued a certification rule;38 New Jersey 
followed suit in 2003.39 North Carolina thus remains the only state 
never to have implemented certification. 
B. Certification’s Benefits 
Scholars have documented certification’s benefits both 
theoretically40 and empirically.41 As its most noticeable benefit, a 
North Carolina certification procedure would relieve federal courts of 
the necessity of predicting unsettled North Carolina law. This 
avoidance is valuable for two reasons. First, it allocates legal 
decisionmaking efficiently. On a novel issue, it is much more difficult 
for a federal court to predict what the North Carolina Supreme Court 
will find persuasive than for the supreme court simply to be 
persuaded.42 Second, the federal court may incorrectly predict how the 
 
reenacted the procedure. UTAH CONST. art. VIII, § 3; UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2-2 (West 2007); 
UTAH R. APP. P. 41. New York avoided a similar problem by amending its constitution before 
enacting a certification statute. See Kaye & Weissman, supra note 34, at 386–93 (describing the 
history of the amendment). But cf. MO. ANN. STAT. § 477.004 (West 2007) (authorizing 
certification); Grantham v. Mo. Dep’t. of Corr., No. 72576, 1990 WL 602159, at *1 (Mo. July 13, 
1990) (en banc) (holding that the Missouri Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to hear certified 
questions under the statute). No constitutional amendment appears to be pending in Missouri. 
 37. Cochran, supra note 13, at 159 n.13. Some U.S. territories, too, had not yet adopted 
certification at that time, but have since done so. See supra notes 14–17 and accompanying text. 
 38. ARK. CONST. amend. LXXX, § 2(D)(3) (2000); ARK. SUP. CT. R. 6-8 (adopted in 2002). 
 39. N.J. R. APP. P. 2:12A refs. & annotations.  
 40. See Paul A. LeBel, Legal Positivism and Federalism: The Certification Experience, 19 
GA. L. REV. 999, 1036, 1038 (1985) (discussing certification’s positivist underpinnings and the 
notion of the state supreme court as the better decisionmaker); Gerald M. Levin, Note, Inter-
Jurisdictional Certification: Beyond Abstention Toward Cooperative Judicial Federalism, 111 U. 
PA. L. REV. 344, 348, 350 (1963) (describing certification’s benefits over abstention in terms of 
judicial economy and increased federal involvement in the state question’s resolution). 
 41. See GOLDSCHMIDT, supra note 18, at 53 (listing a score of benefits identified by federal 
judges and state justices); John B. Corr & Ira P. Robbins, Interjurisdictional Certification and 
Choice of Law, 41 VAND. L. REV. 411, 445–57 (1988) (reporting survey results from state and 
federal judges indicating “overwhelming judicial support” for certification). 
 42. See Kaye & Weissman, supra note 34, at 377 (“Whereas the highest court of the state 
can ‘quite acceptably ride along a crest of common sense, avoiding the extensive citation of 
authority,’ a federal court often must exhaustively dissect each piece of evidence thought to cast 
light on what the highest state court would ultimately decide.” (quoting HENRY J. FRIENDLY, 
FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 142 (1973))). 
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North Carolina Supreme Court would answer the question.43 An 
incorrect guess deprives the present litigants of justice insofar as that 
concept refers to accuracy of outcome, not merely procedural 
fairness.44 It also hurts future litigants who adjust their out-of-court 
behavior to conform to law that will not hold water when tested in the 
North Carolina courts.45 Parties favored by a questionable federal 
decision will engage in forum shopping (loathed by Erie46), while the 
resulting uncertainty breeds, rather than eliminates, litigation. 
In contrast, if the North Carolina Supreme Court hears the 
question, its response will be definitive.47 Because the supreme court 
is the final arbiter of state law, its decision will always be “correct”; 
the parties are thus guaranteed as accurate an outcome as is possible. 
The resulting state law uniformity will create certainty, which benefits 
future parties (who know their rights) and the court system as a whole 
(by reducing suits).48 This uniformity also fosters comity by affording 
North Carolina judges control over the content of North Carolina 
law.49 Resolving unsettled issues of state law requires value-laden 
 
 43. See Smith, supra note 18, at 2124–25 (describing federal courts’ incorrect predictions of 
North Carolina law); see also John R. Brown, Certification—Federalism in Action, 7 CUMB. L. 
REV. 455, 455 n.2 (1977) (listing some of the Fifth Circuit’s incorrect state law predictions); 
Dolores K. Sloviter, A Federal Judge Views Diversity Jurisdiction Through the Lens of 
Federalism, 78 VA. L. REV. 1671, 1679–80 (1992) (same in the Third Circuit). 
 44. But cf. Bruce M. Selya, Certified Madness: Ask a Silly Question . . ., 29 SUFFOLK U. L. 
REV. 677, 690 (1995) (dismissing this concern because “appellate review . . . does not guarantee 
the ‘right’ answer—merely the last answer”). Respectfully, Judge Selya’s point is irrelevant. 
Legal procedures should be tailored toward the best outcome regardless of whether litigants 
have a right to it: that is why appellate judges hear arguments to make their determinations, 
rather than flipping coins. The latter would be just as final, but not as just. 
 45. See William G. Bassler & Michael Potenza, Certification Granted: The Practical and 
Jurisprudential Reasons Why New Jersey Should Adopt a Certification Procedure, 29 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 491, 512 (1998) (“[T]ransaction costs . . . inevitably result when citizens of the 
state attempt to conform their conduct . . . to the non-precedential opinion of a federal court.”).  
 46. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965) (listing the “discouragement of forum-
shopping” as one of Erie’s “twin aims”). 
 47. See Jonathan Remy Nash, Examining the Power of the Federal Courts to Certify 
Questions of State Law, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1672, 1698 (2003) (“[T]he state’s highest court [is] 
the only court capable of rendering a ‘definitive’ statement of state law under Erie and its 
progeny . . . .”). 
 48. See Bassler & Potenza, supra note 45, at 512 (discussing certification’s “broad benefits 
to future litigants” and “elimination of transaction costs”). 
 49. See Clark, supra note 24, at 1465 (“[C]ertification ensures that agents of the 
state . . . resolve unsettled questions of state law.”). 
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policymaking;50 state judges, immersed in this state’s social and legal 
milieu and accountable to its citizens, should decide such issues.51 
Certification obtains this result without forcing the litigants to suffer 
abstention’s cost and delay.52 
Perhaps the most important (though least recognized) benefit of 
certification is that it is discretionary at both ends.53 A federal court 
will certify only those questions of law that it feels are important 
enough to merit the North Carolina Supreme Court’s attention and 
uncertain enough to raise the specter of erroneous decision—a judge 
confident of mastering the relevant law will not certify.54 Likewise, the 
North Carolina Supreme Court may decline the question unless it 
agrees that answering will serve judicial economy, comity, and 
federalism.55 
C. How North Carolina Can Avoid Potential Pitfalls 
Nonconstitutional56 criticisms of certification fall into three basic 
categories: (1) delay for the parties, (2) state court congestion, and (3) 
piecemeal or abstract opinions.57 North Carolina can sidestep each of 
 
 50. Id. at 1469–71. 
 51. LeBel, supra note 40, at 1038. 
 52. See Medina, supra note 22, at 103 (describing certification as a means to achieve 
abstention’s purpose without its problems). Another benefit of certification over abstention is 
that certification preserves federal fact finding and issue framing—assuaging some concerns 
about forum fairness—rather than relegating out-of-state litigants entirely to state court. See, 
e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 12-606 (West 2008) (requiring the certifying court to 
find the underlying facts and frame the questions for review). 
 53. See, e.g., ARK. SUP. CT. R. 6-8(a)(1) (“The Supreme Court may, in its discretion, 
answer questions of law certified to it . . . .”). Certification appears to remain discretionary even 
if couched in “mandatory” terms. Compare, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 2.60.020 (West 
2008) (“[T]he supreme court shall render its opinion in answer [to a properly certified 
question].” (emphasis added)), with Broad v. Mannesmann Anlagenbau, A.G., 10 P.3d 371, 374 
(Wash. 2000) (“[W]hether to answer a certified question . . . is within the discretion of the 
court.”). 
 54. See, e.g., State Auto Mut. Ins. Co. v. McIntyre, 652 F. Supp. 1177, 1195 (N.D. Ala. 1987) 
(“[T]he judge who is here sitting is thoroughly persuaded by his 31 years of trial and appellate 
practice in the Alabama courts . . . that he can reasonably predict the opinion and holding of 
Alabama’s highest court . . . .”). 
 55. Cf. CONN. R. APP. P. § 82-3 (requiring the certified question’s determination to be “in 
the interest of simplicity, directness and economy of judicial action”). 
 56. Unlike these superficial criticisms, certification’s constitutional difficulties in North 
Carolina are genuine. This Note addresses them infra in Part II. 
 57. See Bassler & Potenza, supra note 45, at 509–10 (identifying the same categories). 
  
 
78 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 58:69 
 
these concerns through careful drafting and the North Carolina 
Supreme Court’s conscientious use of discretion. 
First, a North Carolina certification procedure will not force 
federal litigants to endure undue delay. One study indicated that 
federal courts of appeals waited a mean of 6.6 months for the answer 
to a certified question, and district courts waited 8.2 months.58 Not all 
of that time is delay, as regardless of whether certification is 
employed the parties must brief and argue the issue and some court 
must decide it and draft an opinion.59 The relatively small delay from 
certification reflects a tradeoff between fairness and efficiency: time 
in exchange for an authoritative ruling on a difficult issue. Any 
residual disadvantage to the parties will be offset by the benefit that 
settled law brings to future parties and future courts.60 
In addition, North Carolina can avoid unproductive delay 
through careful drafting. A few litigants have had to wait for some 
time merely to find out that a certified question was declined.61 This 
problem can be avoided by drafting a time limit into the certification 
procedure. For example, the Arkansas certification rule specifies that 
a certified question be rejected by default if the Arkansas Supreme 
Court does not accept the question within thirty days.62 Other states 
have chosen different time limits.63 Learning from these states’ 
experience, North Carolina should protect parties from unnecessary 
delay by including a timing provision in its procedure. 
 
 58. GOLDSCHMIDT, supra note 18, at 42. By contrast, the median disposition time for 
federal cases in 2006, from filing in the lower court to appellate decision, was 27.5 months. 
ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2006 JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES 
COURTS 125 tbl.B-4A (2006). 
 59. Bassler & Potenza, supra note 45, at 512. Sometimes certification may reduce the 
decision time on a state law issue. For example, if a federal district court were to certify the 
question of whether the plaintiff stated a claim under state law, the North Carolina Supreme 
Court’s answer would render an appeal on that issue unnecessary. 
 60. See GOLDSCHMIDT, supra note 18, at 109 (“[T]he savings in costs and time to future 
litigants . . . greatly outweigh [the] additional costs . . . incurred by litigants in a single 
certification case.”). 
 61. See Selya, supra note 44, at 681 (lamenting the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico’s 
decision not to answer a series of certified questions after a delay of “some two to three years”). 
 62. ARK. SUP. CT. R. 6-8(a)(2)–(3). The acceptance period can be extended by order. Id. 
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Second, certified questions will not overrun North Carolina’s 
“under-funded and overstretched court system.”64 Federal judges take 
their jurisdiction seriously, regarding certification as a “valuable 
resource” to be preserved, not a “panacea . . . . to be used as a 
convenient way to duck [the court’s] responsibility.”65 The U.S. 
Supreme Court has implied that the difficulty of predicting state law 
is insufficient, by itself, to allow certification.66 A federal court should 
therefore certify only if the question (1) is dispositive,67 (2) cannot be 
determined from precedent,68 and (3) implicates some matter of 
North Carolina policy.69 If other Fourth Circuit states’ experiences are 
an indication, the North Carolina Supreme Court will receive one to 
four questions per year.70 Should answering these questions prove too 
burdensome, the supreme court can decline to do so for lack of time.71 
The North Carolina Supreme Court should also use its discretion 
to winnow out certified questions that do not merit its time and 
attention. If a federal court certifies banal questions of law or 
questions that are too factually specific to be of broad significance, 
 
 64. N.C. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, FISCAL YEAR 2005-06 ANNUAL REPORT: THE 
NORTH CAROLINA JUDICIAL BRANCH 19, available at http://www.nccourts.org/Citizens/ 
Publications/Documents/annualreport_2005-06.pdf. 
 65. Transcon. Gas Pipeline Corp. v. Transp. Ins. Co., 958 F.2d 622, 623 (5th Cir. 1992) (per 
curiam). Another judge contemplated his discretion to certify as follows: 
Prudent exercise of this discretion is important. All certifying courts should be keenly 
aware of their obligation not to abdicate their responsibility to decide issues properly 
before them. They should also be keenly aware that certification involves an 
imposition on the time and resources of the Supreme Court of [the State] and an 
increase in the expenditure of time and resources by the parties . . . . In appropriate 
cases it is the “best solution,” but [not] every case . . . [is] an appropriate case. 
W. Am. Ins. Co. v. Bank of Isle of Wight, 673 F. Supp. 760, 764 (E.D. Va. 1987) (footnote 
omitted). 
 66. See Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 390–91 (1974) (discussing certification and 
noting that “mere difficulty in ascertaining local law is no excuse” for abdicating jurisdiction). 
 67. See John D. Butzner, Jr., & Mary Nash Kelly, Certification: Assuring the Primacy of 
State Law in the Fourth Circuit, 42 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 449, 453 (1985) (describing the Fourth 
Circuit’s prudential limits on certifying). 
 68. Id. 
 69. See Lehman Bros., 416 U.S. at 390–91 (suggesting, because state law difficulty alone is 
insufficient, that some comity interest must be present to justify certification). 
 70. From 1990 to 1994 inclusive, the high courts of South Carolina, Virginia, and West 
Virginia received seven, four, and eighteen certification requests, respectively. (West Virginia 
was the second highest in the nation.) GOLDSCHMIDT, supra note 18, at 34–35 tbl.6. Nationally, 
high courts answered a mean of 6.6 questions each over those five years. Id. 
 71. See Smith, supra note 18, at 2146 (“[I]f the certification procedure . . . is discretionary, 
[the] court will always have a means to control its caseload . . . .”). 
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the benefit to North Carolina will be insubstantial. Even some 
significant questions, such as intricate applications of state 
constitutional law, might be decided better on full factual records 
developed by North Carolina’s state courts.72 Accordingly, the North 
Carolina Supreme Court should decline any certified question that, in 
its determination, does not appreciably further state interests.73 It 
should also set forth its reasons for so concluding in a short, per 
curiam opinion to serve as a guide for future certifying courts.74 This 
conscientious use of discretion will encourage certification only when 
it is worthwhile. 
Third, a properly drafted certification procedure would not force 
the North Carolina Supreme Court to decide cases piecemeal, or 
worse, to decide abstract questions of law without underlying facts. 
By definition, a certified question emerges from a controversy already 
justiciable before an Article III court. The question therefore arises 
out of sufficient operative facts; North Carolina’s procedure can 
require the certifying court to supply them. For comparison, 
Virginia’s procedure requires the certifying order to state the certified 
question and the nature of the controversy in which it arises, a 
statement of all relevant facts, and an explanation of how the certified 
question is determinative of the pending case.75 If the parties dispute 
the facts, the certifying court can be compelled to determine the facts 
before certifying.76 Furthermore, the North Carolina Supreme Court 
can require the certifying court to provide the entire record from 
 
 72. See Randall T. Shepard, Is Making State Constitutional Law Through Certified 
Questions a Good Idea or a Bad Idea?, 38 VAL. U. L. REV. 327, 351 (2004) (worrying that 
certification will “dilute the quality” of constitutional adjudication because “[c]onstitutional 
issues are especially fact sensitive”). 
 73. See, e.g., Wright v. Brooke Group Ltd., 652 N.W.2d 159, 170 n.1 (Iowa 2002) (declining 
to answer certified questions of fact or that require factual determinations); Yesil v. Reno, 705 
N.E.2d 655, 656 (N.Y. 1998) (declining to answer certified questions pertaining to immigration 
because that issue was better left to federal courts); Grabois v. Jones, 667 N.E.2d 307, 307 (N.Y. 
1996) (declining to answer a certified question because the issue was unlikely to recur); Rufino 
v. United States, 506 N.E.2d 910, 911 (N.Y. 1987) (declining to answer a certified question on 
the same subject as an appeal pending in the state system). 
 74. The New York cases cited in supra note 73 are excellent examples of this practice. 
 75. See VA. SUP. CT. R. 5:42(c) (setting forth the requirements for a certification order). 
 76. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 12-606(b) (West 2008) (“If the parties 
cannot agree upon a statement of facts, the certifying court shall determine the relevant facts 
and state them as a part of its certification order.”). 
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below or any portion thereof.77 The supreme court may also retain the 
right to reformulate the question if it determines that the certifying 
court confused or misstated the legal issues.78 Finally, if the question 
remains too abstract despite these tools, the North Carolina Supreme 
Court may decline the question.79 
In sum, a well-drafted and -executed certification procedure 
would serve North Carolina well, if the state can implement it. The 
following Part of this Note examines the constitutional difficulties 
such a procedure faces in North Carolina. The final Part proposes 
ways to sidestep those difficulties so that North Carolina may finally 
get on the certification bandwagon. 
II.  CERTIFICATION’S CONSTITUTIONAL DIFFICULTIES IN NORTH 
CAROLINA 
Implementing certification in North Carolina raises two 
constitutional questions. First, would certification require the North 
Carolina Supreme Court to render impermissible advisory opinions? 
Second, does that court have jurisdiction over the subject matter of 
certified questions? After a brief description of North Carolina’s 
drafting options, Sections A and B address these questions in turn. 
Certification procedures can be created via court rule,80 statute,81 
or both.82 The North Carolina Constitution requires that the North 
Carolina Supreme Court supply a rule for some of certification’s 
procedural aspects, but the General Assembly may statutorily 
 
 77. See, e.g., id. § 12-605(b) (“[The High Court] of this State may require the certifying 
court to deliver all or part of its record . . . .”). 
 78. See, e.g., id. § 12-604 (“The [High Court] of this State may reformulate a question of 
law certified to it.”). To avoid issuing an advisory opinion, however, the North Carolina 
Supreme Court should solicit the certifying court’s input when reformulating a question. See 
infra Part II.A. 
 79. Cf., e.g., Smith v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 548 So. 2d 146, 146 (Ala. 1989) (declining to 
answer an abstract certified question without underlying facts); Willis v. Ga. Power Co., 174 S.E. 
625, 626 (Ga. 1934) (declining to answer a certified question due to overbreadth); Eley v. Pizza 
Hut of Am., 500 N.W.2d 61, 64 (Iowa 1993) (declining to answer a certified question based on 
conflicting facts). 
 80. Cf., e.g., S.C. R. APP. PRAC. 228 (implementing certification via court rule). 
 81. Cf., e.g., W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 51-1A-1 to -13 (West 2007) (implementing certification 
via statute). 
 82. Cf., e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. §§ 12-601 to -613 (West 2007); MD. R. 8-
305 (implementing certification via court rule and statute). 
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implement the aspects of certification not governed by the state 
constitution. The North Carolina Constitution creates a unified 
General Court of Justice within the state, consisting of Appellate, 
Superior Court, and District Court Divisions.83 Only the North 
Carolina Supreme Court may prescribe procedural rules for the 
Appellate Division,84 of which it is a part.85 The North Carolina 
Supreme Court must therefore supply a rule for the procedure that it 
would follow when answering certified questions. On the other hand, 
the General Assembly can regulate when federal courts may send 
questions, as this would prescribe procedure for federal courts, not 
for the North Carolina Supreme Court.86 The General Assembly 
might also be able to prescribe the criteria by which the North 
Carolina Supreme Court would decide whether to answer, by analogy 
to the General Assembly’s power to prescribe the criteria by which 
the North Carolina Supreme Court decides whether to grant 
discretionary review.87 These drafting options are important to keep 
in mind when considering the constitutional questions below, for the 
 
 83. N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 2. 
 84. See id. art. IV, § 13(2) (“The Supreme Court shall have exclusive authority to make 
rules of procedure . . . for the Appellate Division.”). 
 85. See id. art. IV, § 5 (“The Appellate Division . . . shall consist of the Supreme Court and 
the Court of Appeals.”). 
 86. Think of certification as a process consisting of two parts: (1) a federal court sends a 
question and (2) the North Carolina Supreme Court accepts it for review. Logically, a rule 
governing when federal courts may send questions, but not when the supreme court may accept, 
prescribes procedure only for the federal courts. Under a constitutional theory explored infra 
Part II.B, the General Assembly can create a certification procedure for federal courts even if it 
could not prescribe when the North Carolina Supreme could answer. In brief, the reasoning 
proceeds as follows: 
The power to create a certification procedure for federal courts is not mentioned in the 
North Carolina Constitution. See N.C. Const. art. IV, § 13(2) (describing the judicial and 
legislative rulemaking powers). Under prevailing doctrine, the General Assembly may pass any 
statute not prohibited by the constitution, but may not enlarge the North Carolina Supreme 
Court’s jurisdiction. See infra Part II.B. The General Assembly can therefore create a 
certification procedure unless it would enlarge the North Carolina Supreme Court’s jurisdiction. 
So long as the statute does not govern when the supreme court shall answer certified questions, 
it does not affect that court’s jurisdiction and is thus constitutional. For a full explanation of the 
constitutional theory and precedent behind this reasoning, see infra Part II.B. 
 87. See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7A-31 (West 2007) (permitting the supreme court to 
review decisions of significant public interest or legal significance or that conflict with its 
precedent). The General Assembly’s power to pass such a statute depends upon whether the 
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certification procedure’s constitutionality may turn on which branch 
of government adopts it.88 
A. Advisory Opinions 
The North Carolina Supreme Court has held that its opinions 
cannot merely be advisory.89 Certification raises concerns about 
advisory opinions for two reasons: (1) a certified question arises in a 
case pending in a court of another jurisdiction, and (2) the answering 
court decides the question with the expectation that the parties will 
return to the certifying court. 
These concerns are unjustified. Certified questions are unlike 
advisory opinions in all other relevant respects.90 A certified question 
arises out of a bona fide case or controversy justiciable before an 
Article III court; the parties fully brief and argue the question to nest 
it within a concrete factual setting.91 Certification therefore “bears the 
hallmarks of the adversarial system and the purported benefits that 
follow.”92 Unlike an advisory opinion, the North Carolina Supreme 
Court’s decision would have res judicata and stare decisis effect and 
constitute binding law on the present and all future parties.93 
 
 88. For a discussion of whether the General Assembly may constitutionally enlarge the 
North Carolina Supreme Court’s jurisdiction, see infra Part II.B. For an examination of whether 
the North Carolina Supreme Court can exercise the people’s reserved powers, see infra Part 
III.B. 
 89. In re Advisory Opinion, 335 S.E.2d 890, 891 (N.C. 1985) (“The North Carolina 
Constitution does not authorize the Supreme Court as a Court to issue advisory opinions.”). To 
be non-advisory, an opinion must potentially affect an actual dispute between adverse litigants. 
See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302, 304 (1943) (per curiam) (insisting that a case is 
not justiciable in the “absence of a genuine adversary issue between the parties”). As discussed 
in this Section, answers to certified questions are not advisory opinions because they may 
determine a federal litigant's claim. See infra notes 96–99 and accompanying text.  
 90. See Bassler & Potenza, supra note 45, at 521–22 (“The features of advisory opinions 
that make them objectionable . . . are not present in the certification procedure proposed . . . .”). 
 91. See Smith, supra note 18, at 2139 (describing how these concerns persuaded the Maine 
Supreme Court to hold that certified questions are nonadvisory). 
 92. Bassler & Potenza, supra note 45, at 522. 
 93. See, e.g., ALASKA R. APP. P. 407(f) (“The answer to the certified questions shall be res 
judicata as to the parties and have the same precedential force as any other appellate decision of 
the supreme court.”); S.C. R. APP. PRAC. 228(f) (“The decision shall be accorded the same force 
and effect as any other decision of the Supreme Court . . . .”). Such language renders the answer 
to a certified question binding in all U.S. jurisdictions. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, cl. 1 (“Full 
Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the . . . judicial Proceedings of every other 
State.”); 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2000) (“[J]udicial proceedings . . . shall have the same full faith and 
credit in every court within the United States . . . as they have by law or usage in the courts of 
  
 
84 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 58:69 
 
Moreover, certified questions do not implicate the separation-of-
powers concerns plaguing advisory opinions. Certification would not 
encourage the North Carolina Supreme Court to encroach upon the 
realm of the General Assembly. In adjudicating adverse parties’ 
rights on the facts of a single case, the answering court performs a 
quintessentially judicial function94—consider, for example, how out of 
place it would be for a federal court to certify a question to the state 
legislature. To the extent that the North Carolina Supreme Court 
“interferes” with anyone by answering the question, it interferes with 
the certifying court; yet this interference is a fulfillment, not an 
infringement, of federalist principles. When interpreting North 
Carolina law, a federal court is supposed to be subordinate, not 
coordinate, to the North Carolina Supreme Court.95 
Finally, certified questions are more than advisory because they 
are dispositive. Under the Uniform Law, a properly certified question 
is one that may be determinative of the claim.96 The North Carolina 
Supreme Court’s answer, like its ruling on any dispositive motion, has 
the potential to foreclose at least one claim or defense within the 
case.97 If the supreme court discovers that a certified question cannot 
 
such State . . . from which they are taken.”). The answer to a certified question is nonadvisory 
because of this binding effect, much as a monetary judgment against a party with no in-state 
assets is nonadvisory because of its binding effect in other states. Cf., e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-
75.4(5)(a) (West 2007) (granting North Carolina courts long-arm jurisdiction over claims arising 
from promises “to pay for services to be performed in th[e] State”); Blue Ridge Health 
Investors, LLC v. Mars Syst, Inc., No. COA04-1248, 2005 WL 1578391, at *2–3 (N.C. Ct. App. 
July 5, 2005) (exercising jurisdiction under § 1-75.4(5)(a) despite the defendant’s apparent lack 
of in-state assets). 
 94. As one Michigan Supreme Court Justice convincingly argued: 
When an actual controversy exists between parties, it is submitted in formal 
proceedings to a court, the decision of the court is binding upon the parties and their 
privies and is res adjudicata [sic] of the issue in any other proceedings . . . what else 
can the decision be but the exercise of judicial power?  
Melson v. Prime Ins. Syndicate, 696 N.W.2d 687, 696 (Mich. 2005) (Markman, J., dissenting 
from a decision to answer a certified question) (quoting Wash.-Detroit Theater Co. v. Moore, 
229 N.W. 618, 680–81 (1930)). 
 95. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (making state courts’ decisions 
binding on federal courts when state law supplies the rule of decision). 
 96. See Unif. Certification of Questions of Law Act, 12 U.L.A. 67, 73 (1995) (“The 
[Supreme Court] may answer questions of law certified to it . . . which may be determinative of 
the cause . . . .”). 
 97. See W. Helicopter Servs., Inc. v. Rogerson Aircraft Corp., 811 P.2d 627, 630 (Or. 1991) 
(interpreting “may be determinative” to “mean[] that our decision must, in one or more of the 
forms it could take, have the potential to determine at least one claim in the case”). For 
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be determinative, it should decline to answer.98 For this reason, most 
states consider certification a proper exercise of the judicial power, 
not an advisory opinion.99 
B. Subject Matter Jurisdiction 
The North Carolina Constitution does not explicitly grant the 
North Carolina Supreme Court jurisdiction over certified questions. 
Nevertheless, in her 1999 article, Jessica Smith examined North 
Carolina law and concluded that the state could constitutionally enact 
a certification procedure.100 She looked first to the North Carolina 
Supreme Court’s jurisdictional clause, which states: 
The Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction to review upon appeal 
any decision of the courts below, upon any matter of law or legal 
inference. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over “issues of 
fact” and “questions of fact” shall be the same exercised by it prior 
to the adoption of this Article, and the Court may issue any 
remedial writs necessary to give it general supervision and control 
over the proceedings of the other courts. The Supreme Court also 
has jurisdiction to review, when authorized by law, direct appeals 
from a final order or decision of the North Carolina Utilities 
Commission.101 
 
example, consider the question, “Has the plaintiff stated a claim for negligent infliction of 
emotional distress (NIED)?” If the state court refuses to recognize NIED, the plaintiff’s claim 
will fail. Thus the question is dispositive notwithstanding the fact that, if the court recognizes 
NIED and defines its elements, the plaintiff may or may not be able to make out those elements 
at trial. 
 98. See, e.g., Union Planters Bank v. People of the State of New York, No. 1050562, 2008 
WL 274756, at *2–4 (Ala. Feb. 1, 2008) (declining to answer certified questions for lack of 
determinativity); Raborn v. Menotte, 974 So. 2d 328, 332 (Fla. 2008) (declining to answer a 
certified question for mootness); Ball v. Wilshire Ins. Co., 184 P.3d 463, 467 (Okla. 2007) 
(declining to answer certified questions because the certifying court possibly lacked 
jurisdiction). 
 99. Corr & Robbins, supra note 41, at 422. But compare Melson, 696 N.W.2d at 687 
(Young, J., concurring) (arguing that answers to certified questions are advisory opinions), with 
id. at 692–702 (Markman, J., dissenting) (rebutting Justice Young’s argument in detail). 
 100. See Smith, supra note 18, at 2141–43 (discussing the North Carolina Constitution, but 
not the North Carolina Supreme Court’s jurisdictional precedent); see also GOLDSCHMIDT, 
supra note 18, at 98 (acknowledging that precedent but suggesting that certification would be 
constitutional). 
 101. N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 12(1). 
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This provision says nothing about interjurisdictional 
certification.102 Under prevailing constitutional theory, a state 
constitution is not a power-granting, but a power-limiting document: 
any power not prohibited by the North Carolina Constitution’s 
provisions is reserved to the people, and the people may exercise 
their power through their elected representatives.103 Because the 
constitution is ambiguous as to answering certified questions,104 the 
argument runs, that power was reserved to the people and a 
certification procedure may validly be enacted.105 Other states 
adopting this theory, including Florida, Washington, and Idaho, have 
found certification constitutional.106 Using similar reasoning, Smith 
concluded that North Carolina could constitutionally enact a 
certification procedure.107 
Although correct in many respects, Smith’s analysis suffers from 
two defects: (1) it misses a possible peculiarity of North Carolina’s 
constitutional theory, and (2) it fails to consider the North Carolina 
Supreme Court’s jurisdictional precedent. First, although the 
constitution-as-limit theory is entrenched in North Carolina law,108 it is 
 
 102. See id. (delimiting the North Carolina Supreme Court’s jurisdiction without regard to 
certification). 
 103. Smith, supra note 18, at 2141 (quoting Baker v. Martin, 410 S.E.2d 887, 891 (N.C. 
1991)). After citing North Carolina law for this principle, however, Smith next cites the Florida 
Supreme Court’s formulation, which explicitly refers to judicial power. See id. at 2142 (“[A]ll 
sovereign power, including the judicial power, not limited by a state constitution inheres to the 
people . . . .” (emphasis added) (quoting Sun Ins. Office Ltd. v. Clay, 133 So. 2d 735, 741 (Fla. 
1961))). Significantly, the North Carolina formulation does not mention the judicial power. See 
Baker, 410 S.E.2d at 891 (“All power which is not expressly limited by the people in our State 
Constitution remains with the people, and an act of the people through their representatives in 
the legislature is valid unless prohibited by that Constitution.” (emphasis added)). 
 104. One other provision may also bear on this question: the separation-of-powers section of 
the article on the judicial power. See N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (“The General Assembly shall 
have no power to deprive the judicial department of any power or jurisdiction that rightfully 
pertains to it as a co-ordinate department of the government, nor shall it establish or authorize 
any courts other than as permitted by this Article.”). Certification does not establish any new 
court and grants, rather than removes, Supreme Court jurisdiction. Thus, this provision does not 
facially apply, and Smith’s analysis proceeds. The North Carolina Supreme Court, affords the 
policies behind this provision great weight, however. See infra note 127 and accompanying text. 
 105. Smith, supra note 18, at 2141. 
 106. See id. at 2141–42 & nn.139–40 (citing examples from these states). 
 107. Id. at 2143. 
 108. See In re Spivey, 480 S.E.2d 693, 698 (N.C. 1997) (citing the theory to State ex rel. 
Martin v. Preston, 385 S.E.2d 473, 478 (N.C. 1989)). But the theory is much older: 
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always formulated to grant the legislature, not the courts, the power 
to exercise the people’s reserved rights.109 Second, as discussed in the 
remainder of this Section, the North Carolina Supreme Court’s 
precedent prohibits the General Assembly from enlarging the 
supreme court’s jurisdiction even though no such limitation appears 
in the North Carolina Constitution’s text. If only the General 
Assembly may exercise the people’s reserved power, but it may not 
do so to enlarge the supreme court’s jurisdiction, Smith’s argument 
fails.110 
The North Carolina Supreme Court’s jurisdictional precedent, 
beginning with North Carolina Utilities Commission v. Old Fort 
Finishing Plant,111 undercuts Smith’s attempt to apply the constitution-
as-limit theory to the adoption of certification. In 1963, the General 
Assembly enacted a law creating a direct appeal to the North 
Carolina Supreme Court from decisions of the North Carolina 
Utilities Commission.112 Entertaining the first such appeal in Old Fort, 
the supreme court struck down the law as unconstitutional.113 Article 
IV of the North Carolina Constitution had been rewritten in 1962 to 
vest the judicial power of the state in three loci: the General Court of 
Justice, a court for the Trial of Impeachments, and administrative 
agencies.114 A concurrent amendment gave the North Carolina 
 
[S]tate Constitutions are not to be construed as grants of power . . . but rather as 
limitations upon the power of the state Legislature. 
  . . . Consequently, the Legislature of a state may lawfully enact any law, of any 
character, on any subject, unless it is prohibited, in the particular instance, either 
expressly or by necessary implication, by the Constitution of the United States or by 
that of the state, or unless it improperly invades the separate province of one of the 
other departments of the government . . . . 
State v. Lewis, 55 S.E. 600, 602 (N.C. 1906) (quoting BLACK, CONSTITUTIONAL LAWS §§ 100–
01); see also State v. Matthews, 48 N.C. 451, 452–53 (1856) (“With the exception of the 
powers surrendered to the United States, each State is absolutely sovereign. With the exception 
of the restraints imposed by the Constitution of the State and the Bill of Rights, all legislative 
power is vested in the General Assembly.”). 
 109. See sources cited supra notes 103 and 108. 
 110. Compare this argument with infra Part III.B, which analyzes whether the supreme 
court can exercise reserved powers. 
 111. State ex rel. N.C. Utils. Comm’n v. Old Fort Finishing Plant, 142 S.E.2d 8 (N.C. 1965). 
 112. See id. at 9 (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-99). 
 113. Id. at 13. 
 114. The rewritten provisions read: 
  Section 1. . . . The judicial power of the State shall, except as provided in Section 3 
of this Article, be vested in a court for the Trial of Impeachments and in a General 
Court of Justice. . . . 
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Supreme Court “jurisdiction to review upon appeal any decision of 
the courts below, upon any matter of law or legal inference.”115 The 
supreme court reasoned that the North Carolina Constitution 
distinguished administrative agencies from the courts of the General 
Court of Justice and therefore administrative agencies were not 
courts.116 Because the North Carolina Supreme Court had appellate 
jurisdiction only over decisions of the “courts below,” it could not 
review the North Carolina Utilities Commission’s decisions on direct 
appeal.117 Nor did the General Assembly have the power to create 
such an appeal.118 In short, to provide for the direct appeal to the 
supreme court, the Assembly had to amend the North Carolina 
Constitution.119 
Ten years later, the North Carolina Supreme Court reconsidered 
its constitutional jurisdiction in Smith v. State.120 In Smith, a public 
employee sued the state in a superior court for wrongful discharge, 
claiming breach of an employment contract.121 On appeal, although no 
party had raised the issue of original jurisdiction, the Smith court 
examined the validity of General Statute Section 7A-25—granting the 
supreme court original jurisdiction over claims against the state—in 
light of a then-recent constitutional amendment.122 Historically, the 
North Carolina Constitution contained a clause granting the North 
 
  . . . . 
  Sec[tion] 3. . . . The General Assembly may vest in administrative 
agencies . . . such judicial powers as may be reasonably necessary . . . . 
See id. at 11–12 (quoting N.C. CONST. art. IV, §§ 1, 3).  
 115. Id. at 12 (quoting N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. IV, § 10(1) (1962), amended and 
renumbered § 12(1) by N.C. Sess. Laws, ch. 1258 (1969)). 
 116. See id. (“Administrative agencies referred to in Section 3 of Article IV ex vi termini are 
distinguished from courts.”). 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 12–13. The other provisions in the newly amended Article IV were of no help. 
Sections 10(4) and 10(5), both quoted in Old Fort, permitted the Assembly to waive 
jurisdictional limits in civil cases and to provide a proper system of appeals. Id. at 12 (quoting 
N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. IV, §§ 10(4)–(5) (1962), renumbered §§ 12(4)–(5) by N.C. Sess. Laws, 
ch. 1258 (1969)). The supreme court did not address the former and dismissed the latter: 
“Obviously, [Section 10(5)] refers to a system of appeals from a lower court to a higher court 
within the General Court of Justice.” Id. 
 119. See N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 12(1) (“The Supreme Court also has jurisdiction to 
review . . . direct appeals from a . . . decision of the North Carolina Utilities Commission.”). 
 120. Smith v. State, 222 S.E.2d 412 (N.C. 1976). 
 121. Id. at 414, 416. 
 122. Id. at 426–27. 
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Carolina Supreme Court such jurisdiction.123 But a 1971 amendment 
to that provision removed the clause, leaving the surrounding 
material unchanged.124 Interpreting this amendment as divesting it of 
original jurisdiction over claims against the state, the Smith court 
concluded that Section 7A-25 had been implicitly repealed by the 
amendment.125 
The Smith court also opined126 that Section 7A-25, if not 
repealed, would be unconstitutional: “[W]hen the jurisdiction of a 
particular court is constitutionally defined, the legislature cannot by 
statute restrict or enlarge that jurisdiction unless authorized to do so 
by the constitution. This principle is grounded on the separation of 
powers provisions found in many American constitutions . . . .”127 On 
these separation-of-powers grounds, the Smith court interpreted Old 
Fort to hold that the General Assembly may not extend the supreme 
court’s appellate jurisdiction beyond its constitutional limits.128 Section 
7A-25 was unconstitutional because, in light of the 1971 amendment, 
the General Assembly no longer had authority to confer original 
jurisdiction on the North Carolina Supreme Court.129 The supreme 
court’s jurisdiction was therefore “limited ‘to review upon appeal any 
decision of the courts below upon any matter of law or legal 
inference.’”130 
Finally, in In re Martin,131 the North Carolina Supreme Court 
reaffirmed Smith’s interpretation of its jurisdictional clause, but 
allowed the Assembly to create a new type of appeal to the supreme 
 
 123. Id. at 425–26. 
 124. Id. at 426. 
 125. Id. at 428. 
 126. Because neither party had cited Section 7A-25 and the supreme court had already held 
the statute to be repealed, its alternative constitutional holding must be dictum. 
 127. Id. at 428–29. The Smith court’s interpretation is reasonable: the North Carolina 
Constitution contains an explicit Separation of Powers clause. See N.C. CONST. art. I, § 6 (“The 
legislative, executive, and supreme judicial powers of the State government shall be forever 
separate and distinct from each other.”). In addition, the opening section of the North Carolina 
Constitution’s judiciary article reiterates the same concerns. See N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (“The 
General Assembly shall have no power to deprive the judicial department of any power or 
jurisdiction that rightfully pertains to it as a co-ordinate department of the government, nor 
shall it establish or authorize any courts other than as permitted by this Article.”). 
 128. Smith, 222 S.E.2d at 429. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. (quoting N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 12(1)). 
 131. In re Martin, 245 S.E.2d 766 (N.C. 1978). 
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court when constitutionally authorized.132 In 1972, the electorate 
ratified an amendment to the North Carolina Constitution requiring 
the General Assembly to create a nonimpeachment method for the 
removal of incapacitated judges.133 The Assembly responded by 
creating a commission to field removal actions, the decisions of which 
would be reviewed directly by the North Carolina Supreme Court.134 
Judge Martin challenged the act as unconstitutional, arguing that the 
supreme court’s jurisdictional clause contained no provision for such 
an appeal and, under Smith and Old Fort, the Assembly had no 
authority to extend the court’s jurisdiction.135 The Martin court 
confirmed that the Assembly may not expand the supreme court’s 
jurisdiction without constitutional authorization, but held that the 
new amendment provided such authorization.136 The Assembly could 
appropriately select the North Carolina Supreme Court as the venue 
for review because of the supreme court’s general supervisory 
authority over the state courts.137 The statute was therefore 
constitutional.138 
These three cases create a regime under which the North 
Carolina Supreme Court may hear all, but only, those types of cases 
provided for in the text of the North Carolina Constitution. Despite 
the general conception of the North Carolina Constitution as a 
power-limiting document, the General Assembly is bound by the 
constitutional text when providing access to the North Carolina 
Supreme Court. Therefore, if the supreme court determines that it 
does not have jurisdiction to answer certified questions from federal 
courts, precedent prohibits the General Assembly from granting such 
jurisdiction to the supreme court by statute.139 Unfortunately, this 
precedent undermines Smith’s argument that, absent a limitation in 
 
 132. Id. at 770–71. Thus Martin converted Smith’s dicta into controlling law. See id. at 770 
(“[D]iscussing the jurisdiction of this Court, we held, in Smith v. State, . . . that the Supreme 
Court no longer had original jurisdiction over claims against the State . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 769–70. 
 135. Id. at 770. 
 136. Id. at 770–71. 
 137. Id. at 771. 
 138. Id. at 772. 
 139. See Smith v. State, 222 S.E.2d 412, 429 (N.C. 1976) (“[T]he General Assembly [is] 
without authority to expand the appellate jurisdiction of [the North Carolina Supreme Court] 
beyond the limits set in the Constitution.”). 
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the North Carolina Constitution, the General Assembly may validly 
enact a certification law. 
III.  STRATEGIES FOR IMPLEMENTING CERTIFICATION IN  
NORTH CAROLINA 
As the previous Part explains, for a certification statute to be 
constitutional, the North Carolina Supreme Court must interpret its 
jurisdictional clause to include answering certified questions. At first 
glance, the precedent described in Part II.B cuts against this 
interpretation. Section A of this Part reexamines that precedent in 
light of the North Carolina Constitution’s design, the structure of the 
General Court of Justice, and separation-of-powers concerns to 
suggest that the North Carolina Supreme Court does, in fact, have 
jurisdiction to answer certified questions. In the event that the 
supreme court holds to the contrary, the remaining three Sections 
offer alternative strategies for implementing certification. Section B 
considers whether the North Carolina Supreme Court, as opposed to 
the General Assembly, can exercise the people’s reserved powers to 
extend its own jurisdiction. Section C explores a theory, adopted by 
some states, that the supreme court need not exercise jurisdiction 
over a certified question to answer it. Section D, as a final measure, 
proposes a constitutional amendment. 
A. The N.C. Supreme Court Has Jurisdiction to Answer Certified 
Questions 
The North Carolina Constitution grants the North Carolina 
Supreme Court jurisdiction “to review upon appeal any decision of 
the courts below, upon any matter of law or legal inference.”140 In 
light of the supreme court’s precedent, this provision poses three 
obstacles to certification. First, federal courts (though clearly 
“courts”) may not be “courts below”—that is, not lower courts in the 
General Court of Justice.141 Second, certification may not be an 
“appeal,” placing it outside the North Carolina Supreme Court’s 
 
 140. N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 12(1). 
 141. Cf. State ex rel. N.C. Utils. Comm’n v. Old Fort Finishing Plant, 142 S.E.2d 8, 12 (N.C. 
1965) (“[T]he appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court relates solely to appeals from 
decisions of ‘the courts below’ . . . .”). 
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“appellate jurisdiction.”142 Third, because a court certifies a question 
in lieu of determining it, certification may not be a “decision” of a 
court below suitable for review.143 
A certification procedure can overcome all of these obstacles. 
First, the North Carolina Supreme Court’s precedent limiting its 
jurisdiction to “the courts below” is inapposite. Second, certification 
meets the other jurisdiction requirements because it strongly 
resembles discretionary appellate review and the decision to certify 
rests on a “matter of law or legal inference.” Third, the design of the 
North Carolina Constitution and structure of the General Court of 
Justice suggest that the North Carolina Supreme Court can answer 
certified questions. Finally, the separation-of-powers policies 
motivating the North Carolina Supreme Court’s previous, narrow 
interpretation of its jurisdictional clause are inapplicable to 
certification. For these reasons, the North Carolina Supreme Court 
should hold that it has jurisdiction to answer certified questions and 
either allow the General Assembly to enact a certification statute or 
adopt a certification rule on its own motion. 
1. Distinguishing Precedent.  The North Carolina Supreme 
Court’s precedent limiting its jurisdiction to appeals from “the courts 
below” is inapplicable to certification. As discussed in Part II.B, the 
Smith court held that a constitutional amendment had excised the 
constitutional language granting the court original jurisdiction over 
claims against the state, but otherwise had left the relevant provision 
unchanged.144 The drafters’ conscious removal of that language 
stripped the supreme court of its original jurisdiction.145 In contrast, 
certification has never been mentioned in the North Carolina 
 
 142. Cf. id. (limiting the supreme court’s jurisdiction to “appeals from . . . ‘the courts below’” 
(emphasis added)). The Court might consider certification to be original jurisdiction, cf. ARK. 
CONST. amend. LXXX, § 2(D)(3) (“The Supreme Court shall have . . . [o]riginal jurisdiction to 
answer questions of state law certified by a court of the United States . . . .”), or it might 
consider certification to be sui generis, distinct from both original and appellate jurisdiction, cf. 
Scott v. Bank One Trust Co., 577 N.E.2d 1077, 1079 (Ohio 1991) (holding that the Ohio 
Supreme Court “need[s] no grant of jurisdiction in order to answer certified questions” because 
that power “exists by virtue of Ohio’s very existence as a state in our federal system”). 
 143. Cf. Old Fort, 142 S.E.2d at 12 (limiting jurisdiction to appeals from “decisions” of the 
courts below). 
 144. Smith v. State, 222 S.E.2d 412, 425–26 (N.C. 1976). 
 145. Id. at 428. 
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Constitution. There is no evidence that the drafters intentionally 
denied the North Carolina Supreme Court the power to hear certified 
questions; they probably never contemplated it. If the supreme court 
has jurisdiction to hear certified questions, that jurisdiction remains; 
no constitutional amendment removed it. 
Old Fort is more on point. In Old Fort, the General Assembly 
attempted to create a direct appeal from administrative agencies to 
the North Carolina Supreme Court.146 But because administrative 
agencies were distinguished from courts in the North Carolina 
Constitution’s text, those agencies could not be “courts” below the 
supreme court under the language of that court’s jurisdictional 
clause.147 The North Carolina Constitution’s explicit distinction of 
administrative agencies from courts proved that it did not authorize 
the North Carolina Supreme Court to hear appeals from 
administrative agencies. 
Conversely, the North Carolina Constitution does not explicitly 
distinguish federal courts from state courts; it does not mention 
federal courts at all. Unlike administrative agencies, federal courts are 
(as their name and operation show) “courts.” The sole question is 
whether they are “below” the N.C. Supreme Court. Erie commands 
that federal courts, when deciding North Carolina law, attempt to 
predict what the North Carolina Supreme Court would hold.148 They 
are subordinate to the North Carolina Supreme Court, bound by its 
decisions just like any state court.149 Certification’s sole purpose is to 
alleviate problems arising from federal courts’ subservience to the 
North Carolina Supreme Court. Federal courts should therefore be 
considered “courts below.” 
2. Other Jurisdictional Limits.  Certification also satisfies the 
“appeal” and “decision” requirements. First, like an appeal, a 
certified question arises out of a case or controversy in an inferior 
 
 146. Old Fort, 142 S.E.2d at 9. 
 147. Id. at 12. 
 148. See, e.g., Waste Control Specialists, LLC v. Envirocare of Tex., Inc., 199 F.3d 781, 785 
n.2 (5th Cir. 2000) (“[A] federal court applies state law exactly as would a state court.” (citing 
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 64 (1938))), modified on other grounds, 207 F.3d 225 
(5th Cir. 2000). 
 149. Perhaps one could say the same thing about state administrative agencies. But Old Fort 
did not hold that these agencies were not “below” the Supreme Court, it held that they were not 
“courts below.” Old Fort, 142 S.E.2d at 12 (emphasis added). 
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court,150 and the inferior court finds all of the relevant facts.151 The 
North Carolina Supreme Court would determine whether to answer 
the question in a manner similar to granting discretionary appellate 
review.152 The subject matter of a certified question, a dispositive 
question of state law, falls within the supreme court’s normal scope of 
appellate review—“any matter of law or legal inference.”153 These 
similarities have led other states to consider certification an exercise 
of appellate jurisdiction. For example, the New Jersey Supreme Court 
adopted a certification rule154 even though its constitutional authority 
extends only to “appellate jurisdiction in the last resort.”155 The North 
Carolina Supreme Court should similarly interpret “appeals” to 
include certified questions. 
Second, the “decision” requirement is very lax. The supreme 
court emphasized in 2005 that “decision” refers to “any decision of 
the courts below, upon any matter of law or legal inference”—in that 
case, a trial judge’s order in a declaratory judgment action.156 If the 
supreme court is true to its word, the decision to certify ought to be 
enough: it requires a legal judgment as to whether the question meets 
certification’s requirements.157 Because this is a decision on a “matter 
 
 150. See Smith, supra note 18, at 2139 (noting that “the parties are before the court and are 
given the opportunity to present briefs and oral arguments,” so “it is clear that there is a 
germane live controversy pending in the federal court which will be decided”). 
 151. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 12-606(b) (LexisNexis 2006) (requiring 
the certifying court to determine the relevant facts before certifying). 
 152. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
 153. See N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 12(1) (“The Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction to review 
upon appeal any decision of the courts below, upon any matter of law or legal inference.”). 
 154. N.J. R. APP. P. 2:12A (authorizing certification). 
 155. N.J. CONST. art. VI, § 2, cl. 2. New Jersey is not unusual in this respect. See, e.g., MISS. 
CONST. art. VI, § 146 (granting the Mississippi Supreme Court “such jurisdiction as properly 
belongs to a court of appeals); MISS. R. APP. P. 20 (allowing certified questions); W. VA. CONST. 
art. VIII, § 3 (granting the West Virginia Supreme Court, inter alia, such “appellate 
jurisdiction . . . as may be prescribed by law”); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 51-1A (West 2007) 
(allowing certified questions). But see, e.g., VA. CONST. art. VI, § 1 (“The [Virginia] Supreme 
Court shall . . . have original jurisdiction . . . to answer questions of state law certified by a court 
of the United States . . . .”). 
 156. James v. Bartlett, 607 S.E.2d 638, 641 (N.C. 2005). 
 157. On the other hand, because a trial court’s decision to certify precedes any decision on 
the merits, the North Carolina Supreme Court might hold that that a trial court’s decision to 
certify is insufficient to allow review. If the North Carolina Supreme Court so holds, 
certification should still be possible from appellate courts. Cf., e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
13:72.1 (2007) (allowing certification only from appellate courts); LA. SUP. CT. R. XII (same). 
An appellate court can only certify after the trial court’s decision on the merits; the North 
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of law or legal inference” the North Carolina Supreme Court should 
hold that it may answer certified questions. 
3. Constitutional Design and the General Court’s Structure.  
Furthermore, the North Carolina Constitution’s design and the 
structure of the General Court of Justice indicate that the North 
Carolina Supreme Court has jurisdiction to answer certified 
questions. First, the North Carolina Constitution grants the supreme 
court “general supervision and control” over the General Court of 
Justice.158 The supreme court superintends the courts below with 
appellate jurisdiction over decisions on any legal matter and the 
power to issue writs affecting their proceedings.159 It further controls 
these proceedings during the appellate process via its rulemaking 
authority.160 These clauses envision a supreme court occupied by 
questions of law, aiming toward general judicial control of all law 
produced by courts within the state. 
Certification respects this constitutional design. It asks the North 
Carolina Supreme Court to do only what it is in the very business of 
doing: resolving, in its discretion, questions of state law that arise out 
of cases or controversies in inferior courts. Like the power to issue 
writs, certification aims to reinforce the supreme court’s supervisory 
control over all law produced by the courts within the state. 
Moreover, it provides this service in situations—federal court cases—
in which state law applies but appellate review is not available. In 
these situations, certification furthers the North Carolina 
Constitution’s goals by providing a second-best supervisory 
opportunity. 
Second, the structure of the General Court of Justice indicates 
that the North Carolina Supreme Court is vested with the power to 
 
Carolina Supreme Court could review the trial court’s decision. To analogize to existing law, the 
supreme court has discretion to review a case before it has been determined by the North 
Carolina Court of Appeals. See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7A-31 (West 2007) (allowing for 
supreme court review “either before or after [the claim] has been determined by the Court of 
Appeals”). A question certified from a federal appellate court before it determines the claim’s 
merits should likewise be reviewable. If necessary, the certification procedure can reflect the 
foregoing concerns by allowing only appellate courts to certify. 
 158. N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 12(1) (“[T]he Court may issue any remedial writs necessary to 
give it general supervision and control over the proceedings of the other courts.”). 
 159. Id. 
 160. See id. art. IV, § 13(2) (defining the supreme court’s rulemaking authority). 
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hear certified questions. The North Carolina Constitution vests all of 
the relevant judicial power in the General Court of Justice,161 a 
“unified judicial system” within the state.162 As the court of last resort 
in the General Court, only the North Carolina Supreme Court can 
render definitive interpretations of state law.163 It is just such a 
definitive interpretation of state law that a court requests when 
certifying a question. A certifying court therefore asks for an exercise 
of judicial power that only the North Carolina Supreme Court can 
perform. Since all of the relevant judicial power is vested in the 
General Court, and since the North Carolina Supreme Court is the 
only court within the General Court that could exercise this aspect of 
that power, by process of elimination the North Carolina Supreme 
Court must be the court vested with the power to answer certified 
questions.164 
In re Martin suggests that these institutional-competence 
considerations are appropriate when determining the proper venue 
for a new procedure. In Martin, because of the North Carolina 
Supreme Court’s general supervisory control over the state courts, 
the General Assembly could establish it as the reviewing court for a 
removal procedure for incapacitated judges.165 Similarly, the North 
Carolina Supreme Court’s general supervisory authority over state 
courts and its sole ability to issue definitive state law rulings make it 
the appropriate court to answer certified questions. 
4. Separation of Powers Does Not Apply.  Finally, the policies 
behind the precedent limiting the General Assembly’s power to 
expand the North Carolina Supreme Court’s jurisdiction do not apply 
to certification. In both Smith and Old Fort, the North Carolina 
 
 161. The North Carolina Constitution vests the state’s judicial power in three loci: the 
General Court of Justice, the Court for the Trial of Impeachments, and administrative agencies. 
See id. art. IV, §§ 1, 3. Certification, which involves neither impeachment nor administrative 
hearings, implicates only the General Court of Justice’s power. 
 162. Id. art. IV, § 2. 
 163. See Nash, supra note 47, at 1698 (“[T]he state’s highest court [is] the only court capable 
of rendering a ‘definitive’ statement of state law under Erie and its progeny . . . .”). 
 164. A counterargument could be that the power to answer certified questions is not part of 
“the judicial power” vested in the General Court of Justice at all. This argument misses the 
point that answering certified questions—that is, deciding state law questions arising from 
justiciable cases—is quintessentially judicial. See supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
 165. In re Martin, 245 S.E.2d 766, 771 (N.C. 1978). 
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Supreme Court struck down statutes providing for proceedings in the 
supreme court as a matter of right.166 Theoretically, if the General 
Assembly could propagate mandatory appeals by the thousands, the 
North Carolina Supreme Court’s constitutional duty to supervise the 
lower courts (and its ability to judicially review statutes) would be 
diluted out of existence. In that sense, enlarging the supreme court’s 
jurisdiction implicates separation-of-powers concerns. But 
certification is discretionary, and so poses no dilution problem.167 
Certification’s goal—to preserve the integrity of state law in a federal 
system—has nothing to do with one part of the state government 
encroaching on the province of another. For this reason, if no other, 
the North Carolina Supreme Court should hold that it has jurisdiction 
to answer certified questions. 
If the supreme court has such jurisdiction, the General Assembly 
can enact a certification statute—for it will not be enlarging the 
supreme court’s jurisdiction—or the supreme court can adopt a rule 
on its own motion.168 A version of the 1995 Uniform Law,169 with 
which many courts across the nation are familiar, would work well. 
The procedure should also incorporate the three recommendations 
described in Part I.C: the law should be tailored to require (1) that the 
North Carolina Supreme Court accept a question within, say, thirty 
days or else the question shall be rejected by default; (2) that the 
North Carolina Supreme Court answer or decline to answer questions 
by written memorandum, setting forth the question certified and the 
reason(s) for (non)acceptance; and (3) that the answer to a certified 
question shall be res judicata to the parties, have the force and effect 
of other decisions of the North Carolina Supreme Court, and be 
 
 166. The statute struck down in Smith granted the N.C. Supreme Court original jurisdiction 
over claims against the state. Smith v. State, 222 S.E.2d 412, 429 (N.C. 1976). The statute struck 
down in Old Fort created a direct appeal from the N.C. Utilities Commission to the N.C. 
Supreme Court. State ex rel. N.C. Utils. Comm’n v. Old Fort Finishing Plant, 142 S.E.2d 8, 9 
(N.C. 1965). That appeal was by right. See 1963 N.C. Sess. Laws, c. 1165, § 1 (providing that the 
direct appeal to the North Carolina Supreme Court under Section 62-99 be taken in the same 
manner as other appeals to North Carolina Superior Court). 
 167. If the separation-of-powers objection to certification is fear of an aggrandized supreme 
court, it is even less troublesome. The procedure, if enacted by statute, can just as easily be 
repealed by statute. The General Assembly will not really have yielded any power at all. 
 168. See N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 13(2) (granting the supreme court appellate rulemaking 
power). 
 169. UNIF. CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS OF LAW ACT, 12 U.L.A. 67 (1995). 
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published in the same manner. These improvements will help realize 
certification’s goals and avoid potential pitfalls. 
B. If the North Carolina Supreme Court Lacks Jurisdiction: 
Exercising Reserved Powers 
Notwithstanding the previous Section’s reasoning, the North 
Carolina Supreme Court may hold that it does not have jurisdiction to 
answer certified questions. If it does so, a question arises as to 
whether the supreme court can extend its own jurisdiction; this 
inquiry returns to Smith’s constitution-as-limit argument.170 The North 
Carolina Constitution does not mention answering certified 
questions; therefore the power to provide for such a procedure must 
have been reserved to the people.171 Usually, the General Assembly 
exercises the people’s reserved powers,172 but separation-of-powers 
concerns prevent the General Assembly doing so to enlarge the 
North Carolina Supreme Court’s jurisdiction.173 The inquiry need not 
end there: because the power to answer certified questions is 
quintessentially judicial,174 in other states adopting the constitution-as-
limit theory, the court has exercised the people’s reserved powers.175 
Like the highest courts in Florida, Idaho, and Minnesota, the North 
Carolina Supreme Court could extend its jurisdiction to answering 
certified questions from federal courts.176 
If the North Carolina Supreme Court believes this theory is 
sound as to its jurisdiction, under the rulemaking power it can 
probably adopt any sort of certification procedure it wishes. The 
theory, though, can be sound only when answering certified questions 
 
 170. See supra Part II.B. 
 171. See State ex rel. Martin v. Preston, 385 S.E.2d 473, 478 (N.C. 1989) (“All power which is 
not expressly limited by the people in our State Constitution remains with the people . . . .”). 
 172. See id. (“[A]n act of the people through their representatives in the legislature is valid 
unless prohibited by that Constitution.” (emphasis added)). 
 173. See Smith v. State, 222 S.E.2d 412, 429 (N.C. 1976) (“[T]he General Assembly [is] 
without authority to expand the . . . jurisdiction of this Court beyond the limits set in the 
Constitution.”); see also supra Part II.B. 
 174. See supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
 175. See, e.g., Sunshine Mining Co. v. Allendale Mut. Ins. Co., 666 P.2d 1144, 1147–48 
(Idaho 1983) (interpreting the Idaho Supreme Court’s jurisdictional clause as a limitation, not a 
grant, and holding that the court had inherent judicial power to create a certification 
procedure). 
 176. See Smith, supra note 18, at 2141–42 & nn.139–40 (citing examples from these states). 
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remains within the judicial power. The procedure described at the 
conclusion of Section A firmly roots certification within that power by 
avoiding advisory opinions and properly limiting certification’s 
scope.177 The North Carolina Supreme Court could adopt it. 
Realistically, however, the supreme court is unlikely to hold that 
it may validly exercise the people’s reserved powers. The enunciation 
of the constitution-as-limit theory in North Carolina has always 
granted that right to the General Assembly alone.178 More broadly, 
the potential ramifications of the North Carolina Supreme Court’s 
exercise of the people’s reserved powers would be frightening. If that 
court may extend its jurisdiction under this theory provided that its 
activities remain “quintessentially judicial,” could the governor 
exercise the people’s reserved powers so long as the governor’s 
activities remained “quintessentially executive”? This theory would 
countenance plenary power in ways that seem foreign to the 
American understanding of government. More likely, the right to 
exercise the people’s reserved power is the exclusive prerogative of 
the General Assembly, where such acts are subject to the safeguards 
of bicameralism179 and presentment.180 
C. If the North Carolina Supreme Court Lacks Jurisdiction: 
Answering Without Exercising Jurisdiction 
The North Carolina Supreme Court could also implement 
certification under the Oklahoma and Ohio Supreme Courts’ view 
that no exercise of jurisdiction is required to answer a certified 
question.181 The Ohio Supreme Court, like the North Carolina 
 
 177. See supra Parts I.C, III.A; see also supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
 178. See, e.g., State v. Lewis, 55 S.E. 600, 602 (N.C. 1906) (“[S]tate Constitutions are not to 
be construed as grants of power . . . but rather as limitations upon the power of the state 
Legislature.” (emphasis added) (quoting BLACK, CONSTITUTIONAL LAWS § 100)); accord State 
ex rel. Martin v. Preston, 385 S.E.2d 473, 478 (N.C. 1989) (“All power which is not expressly 
limited by the people in our State Constitution remains with the people, and an act of the 
people through their representatives in the legislature is valid unless prohibited by that 
Constitution.” (emphasis added)). 
 179. See N.C. CONST. art. II, § 1 (dividing the General Assembly into two legislative bodies). 
 180. See id. art. II § 22(1) (permitting gubernatorial veto). 
 181. See Scott v. Bank One Trust Co., 577 N.E.2d 1077, 1079 (Ohio 1991) (holding that the 
Ohio Supreme Court “need[s] no grant of jurisdiction in order to answer certified questions” 
because that power “exists by virtue of Ohio’s very existence as a state in our federal system”); 
Bonner v. Okla. Rock Corp., 863 P.2d 1176, 1178 n.3 (Okla. 1993) (“This court needs no explicit 
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Supreme Court, would strike down any statute purporting to extend 
its constitutional jurisdiction.182 Nevertheless, the Ohio Supreme 
Court allows certification because it does not consider its answer to 
be an exercise of jurisdiction: although the Ohio Supreme Court’s 
answer affects the case before the certifying court, the latter court 
alone ultimately decides the case.183 The Ohio Supreme Court instead 
grounds its power to answer in the structure of the U.S. Constitution 
as reflected in Erie: 
[T]he Ohio Constitution permits the state to exercise its own 
sovereignty as far as the United States Constitution and laws permit. 
Since federal law recognizes Ohio’s sovereignty by making Ohio law 
applicable in federal courts, the state has the power to exercise and 
the responsibility to protect that sovereignty. Therefore, if 
answering certified questions serves to further the state’s interests 
and preserve the state’s sovereignty, the appropriate branch of state 
government—this court—may constitutionally answer them.184 
A certification rule under Ohio’s theory could be much broader 
in scope than the Uniform Rule. For example, an advisory opinion 
could conceivably “further the state’s interests and preserve the 
state’s sovereignty,”185 so the requirement that the certified question 
be determinative would be unnecessary. The North Carolina Supreme 
Court should therefore be skeptical of the Ohio court’s reasoning: the 
North Carolina Supreme Court cannot constitutionally issue advisory 
opinions.186 But, advisory opinions are generally prohibited in Ohio as 
well.187 Presumably, the North Carolina Supreme Court could adopt a 
certification rule under Ohio’s theory if the rule did not permit 
advisory opinions. The procedure recommended at the conclusion of 
 
grant of jurisdiction to answer certified questions from a federal court; such power comes from 
the United States Constitution’s grant of state sovereignty.”). 
 182. See Scott, 577 N.E.2d at 1079 (“[N]either statute nor rule of court can expand our 
jurisdiction beyond the constitutional grant. If [the certification rule] expanded our jurisdiction, 
we would have to declare it unconstitutional.” (citations omitted)). 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. at 1079–80. 
 185. Id. 
 186. In re Advisory Opinion, 335 S.E.2d 890, 891 (N.C. 1985) (“The North Carolina 
Constitution does not authorize the Supreme Court as a Court to issue advisory opinions.”). 
 187. See State ex rel. Todd. v. Felger, 877 N.E.2d 673, 676 (Ohio 2007) (“[O]ur general rule 
[is] that we will not issue advisory opinions . . . .”). 
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Section A incorporates a determinativity requirement,188 which avoids 
advisory opinions.189 
D. If the North Carolina Supreme Court Lacks Jurisdiction: 
Constitutional Amendment 
As a final measure, the General Assembly could amend the 
North Carolina Constitution to permit certification.190 The last 
sentence of the supreme court’s jurisdictional clause could be 
amended: 
The Supreme Court also has jurisdiction to decide, when authorized 
by law, the following: 
(a) Direct appeals from a final order or decision of the North 
Carolina Utilities Commission, and 
(b) At the Supreme Court’s discretion, questions of North 
Carolina law certified from courts of other jurisdictions.191 
This amendment would allow the North Carolina Supreme Court the 
discretion to hear certified questions while affording the General 
Assembly some influence over the process. Just as it may establish the 
criteria for discretionary appeals,192 the General Assembly could 
establish acceptance criteria for certified questions.193 If the proposed 
amendment passes, the General Assembly should adopt the version 
of the Uniform Law194 described at the conclusion of Section III.A. By 
 
 188. See UNIF. CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS OF LAW ACT, 12 U.L.A. 67, 73 (1995) (“The 
[Supreme Court] of this State may answer questions of law certified to it . . . which may be 
determinative of an issue in pending litigation in the certifying court . . . .”). 
 189. For a description of how determinativity avoids advisory opinions, see supra Part II.A. 
 190. See In re Martin, 245 S.E.2d 766, 770–71 (N.C. 1978) (allowing the General Assembly to 
create a new appeal to the supreme court because of an authorizing constitutional amendment). 
 191. Cf. N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 12 (“The Supreme Court also has jurisdiction to review, 
when authorized by law, direct appeals from a final order or decision of the North Carolina 
Utilities Commission.”). 
 192. See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7A-31(b) (West 2007) (permitting the supreme court to 
review decisions of significant public interest or legal significance or that conflict with its 
precedent). 
 193. The North Carolina Supreme Court would retain control over certification’s procedural 
aspects. See N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 13(2) (granting the North Carolina Supreme Court appellate 
rulemaking power). 
 194. UNIF. CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS OF LAW ACT, 12 U.L.A. 67 (1995). 
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maximizing certification’s benefits and minimizing its costs, this 
procedure will serve judicial economy, preserve the integrity of state 
law in our federal system, and inspire us to a divine comity. 
CONCLUSION 
North Carolina is the only state never to have enacted a 
certification procedure. Previous calls for certification’s adoption in 
this state, notably Professor Smith’s in 1999, have been unsuccessful, 
perhaps because the North Carolina Supreme Court’s jurisdictional 
precedent seems to undercut certification’s constitutionality. 
Reexamined in light of the North Carolina Constitution’s design and 
the structure of the General Court of Justice, however, this precedent 
does not render certification unconstitutional. Even if the North 
Carolina Supreme Court holds to the contrary, certification could be 
adopted under a theory that answering certified questions does not 
require an exercise of jurisdiction or by constitutional amendment. 
North Carolina therefore can and should adopt certification. 
Such a procedure will avoid federal court guesswork on difficult state 
law issues, ensuring fairness for the litigants while saving time and 
money for future parties and the North Carolina courts. 
Certification’s potential pitfalls can be circumvented through careful 
drafting and the North Carolina Supreme Court’s conscientious use of 
discretion: that court should decline to answer cases that fail to meet 
certification’s requirements or serve state interests. With these 
principles of judicial economy, comity, and federalism in mind, North 
Carolina should at last join the rest of the union in adopting 
certification. 
